The groundwork for the eventual Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Clashes began in May 2022, with the deterioration in Pakistan-Talibal relations, when the Taliban administration in Kabul failed to mediate peace talks between Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistan Army, and notably neglected to act against Baloch separatist elements operating from Afghan soil.
Ajmal Sohail
Tensions escalated sharply on August 7, 2022, following targeted airstrikes by the Pakistan
Army that killed Omar Khalid Khorasani—TTP’s deputy leader—in Paktika province, along
with four senior TTP commanders, and simultaneously eliminated Yasir Waziristani in
Kandahar.
These strikes exposed the Taliban’s inability or unwillingness to restrain anti-
Pakistan militants, triggering open discord and setting the stage for the armed clashes that
followed by the recent border clashes between Taliban forces and the Pakistan Army in Spin
Boldak district on October 13–14, 2025, mark a significant escalation in tensions between
two historically entangled neighbors.
These confrontations, which resulted in a seven-point agreement signed just days earlier,
reveal deeper fault lines not only between Islamabad and Kabul but also within the Taliban’s own power structure. Understanding the causes and prospects of this conflict requires unpacking the strategic, ideological, and factional dynamics at play.
Underlying Causes
1. The Fragile Nature of the October 12 Agreement
The meeting at the XII Corps headquarters in Quetta between the Governor of Kandahar, Al-Haj Mullah Mohammad Shirin Akhund, and Pakistan’s XII Corps commander General Rahat Naseem Khan was intended to reset bilateral relations.
The seven-point agreement addressed critical issues: border terminology, militant sanctuaries, surveillance infrastructure, refugee management, and trade facilitation. However, the accord was negotiated and signed by the Kandahar faction without broader Taliban consensus, particularly excluding the Ministry of Defense and the Haqqani Network.
This unilateral diplomacy triggered immediate backlash. The Haqqani Network and other
factions viewed the agreement as an attempt by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada and his
close circle to monopolize foreign policy and security decisions. Their exclusion from the
process undermined the legitimacy of the accord and set the stage for armed retaliation.
2. Internal Taliban Power Struggles
The Taliban is not a monolithic entity.
Since its return to power in 2021, internal divisions have deepened between the Kandahar-based leadership loyal to Mullah Hibatullah and other factions, notably the Haqqani Network and the Ministry of Defense. The Haqqani Network, with strong ties to eastern Afghanistan and historical links to Pakistan’s intelligence services, has increasingly challenged Kandahar’s dominance.
The Qatar talks, initiated by Pakistan to salvage the agreement, were perceived by the
Haqqani Network as further evidence of Kandahar’s overreach. Their public condemnation
of Mullah Hibatullah and his associates, including the Governor of Balkh and the Police Chief
of Kandahar underscored the growing resentment over perceived marginalization and the
rewriting of Taliban history to favor a select few.
3. Strategic Concerns Over Border Control
Pakistan’s desire to install surveillance infrastructure along the Durand Line and redefine the border’s terminology reflects its long-standing security concerns. The Taliban’s concession to refer to the frontier simply as the “border” was symbolically significant, but deeply controversial within Afghan nationalist circles.
The Durand Line remains a sensitive issue, and any perceived compromise risks inflaming public sentiment and internal dissent.
Moreover, the agreement’s provision allowing joint operations against BLA and TTP
hideouts inside Afghanistan, based on Pakistani intelligence, raised alarms among Taliban
commanders who fear encroachment on Afghan sovereignty.
4. India’s Strategic Outreach to the Taliban
India’s recent diplomatic overture toward the Taliban, particularly the visit of Taliban
Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi in October 2025, has added a critical layer
to the unfolding Pakistan, Afghanistan border crisis.
While India has not formally recognized the Taliban regime, its decision to host Muttaqi for high-level talks on trade, counterterrorism, and humanitarian aid signaled a pragmatic shift in New Delhi’s regional posture.
This move was met with alarm in Islamabad. The Pakistan Army, already wary of the
Taliban’s internal power struggles, viewed India’s engagement as a direct challenge to its
long-standing policy of strategic depth, a doctrine that envisions Afghanistan as a buffer
zone against Indian influence.
The timing of the Taliban–India talks, coinciding with the signing of the October 12 agreement between the Kandahar faction and Pakistan’s XII Corps, was interpreted by Pakistani military planners as a betrayal of Islamabad’s security interests.
The anger within Pakistan’s military establishment was further compounded by the
perception that Mullah Hibatullah’s faction is pursuing an independent foreign policy, one
that includes outreach to India, the Gulf, and even Western humanitarian actors.
For Islamabad, this pragmatic Taliban diplomacy is intolerable not only because it undermines Pakistan’s leverage over Kabul, but also because it risks legitimizing a regime that may pivot away from Pakistani strategic priorities.
The Haqqani Network, traditionally closer to Pakistan’s intelligence services, echoed these
concerns. In their condemnation of the Kandahar faction’s unilateral diplomacy, they cited
India’s growing footprint in Taliban-led Afghanistan as evidence of a dangerous realignment. This internal Taliban dissent combined with Pakistan’s strategic unease helped catalyze the border clashes in Spin Boldak on October 13–14.
Prospects for Resolution
1 Diplomatic Re-engagement via Doha
The Doha initiative offers a potential pathway to institutionalize the agreement. By elevating the accord to ministerial level and involving third-party mediators, Pakistan hopes to secure broader Taliban buy-in. However, success depends on whether the Taliban leadership can reconcile its internal divisions and present a unified negotiating front.
2. Need for Intra-Taliban Consensus
Without internal cohesion, any bilateral agreement risks collapse. The Taliban must address
grievances from sidelined factions, particularly the Haqqani Network, whose operational
influence and regional ties make them indispensable to any durable settlement. A power-
sharing framework or consultative mechanism may be necessary to prevent future
unilateral diplomacy.
3. Regional Mediation and Oversight
Turkey and Qatar’s involvement signals growing regional interest in stabilizing
Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Their role as neutral facilitators could help bridge trust
deficits and ensure compliance with future agreements. Additionally, regional forums like
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may offer platforms for multilateral
engagement.
4. Strategic Trade-Offs
Both Pakistan and the Taliban have incentives to de-escalate. For Pakistan, border stability is essential to counterterrorism operations and economic connectivity. For the Taliban, easing trade restrictions and securing refugee protocols are vital for domestic legitimacy and international recognition. These mutual interests could form the basis of a pragmatic
détente.
The October 2025 border clashes are symptomatic of deeper structural and ideological rifts within the Taliban and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the seven-point agreement offered a framework for cooperation, its premature signing and lack of internal consensus triggered violent backlash. Moving forward, resolution will require inclusive diplomacy, regional mediation, and a recognition that stability cannot be imposed, it must be negotiated across factional lines.
Ajmal Sohail is a National security and counter Narco-terrorism Analyst, focusing on the Greater Middle East region, particularly on Afghanistan. He has a comprehensive experience in analysis in politics, conflicts and intelligence, multilateral diplomacy, national and international politics, national security and security studies, counter terrorism, democracy, peace development, geopolitics, NGO and crisis management
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
