The war in Iran marks a decisive turning point in the political and security architecture of the Gulf region that boasted of being a beacon of prosperity in a war-torn geographic area.
For decades, relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors were defined by a mix of rivalry, ideological tension, and cautious coexistence. Periods of escalation were often followed by pragmatic de-escalation, driven by shared economic interests and a mutual desire to avoid catastrophic conflict.
That cycle has now been broken after Iran launched unprecedented attacks on its neighbors in retaliation for US and Israeli strikes on February 28. The UAE was attacked the most while Oman, a key Tehran ally and mediator in talks with Washington, was largely left out of the aggression.
Fundamental alteration
The scale and directness of the recent war have fundamentally altered how Gulf states perceive Iran. What was once viewed as a manageable strategic competitor is now widely seen as an immediate and unpredictable threat. At the same time, Iran itself emerges from the conflict transformed—economically strained, politically hardened, but still determined to assert regional influence. The result is a new and uncertain landscape in which the future of Iran–Gulf relations could unfold in several very different ways.
The attacks dealt a severe blow to the image the Gulf, particularly larger countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and more or less Qatar had created as economic powerhouses with ambitious projects and a luxury touristic destination.
Tourists in the UAE were taken by surprise in the wake of the attacks and the hospitality industry in the country took a heavy hit during a peak tourism season. Similarly in Qatar where many thousands of people transit for longer journeys.
Iran’s attacks also struck civilian infrastructure and where it hurts the Gulf most – in its energy infrastructure.
Slowing down
Economically, the war has begun to slow or complicate ambitious national development plans across the Gulf. Governments have had to redirect attention and resources toward defense and emergency preparedness, while private investors have become more cautious. Large-scale projects tied to economic diversification—ranging from megacities to tourism initiatives—now face delays or increased costs due to heightened geopolitical risk. The psychological effect is just as important as the material one: the sense of forward momentum that had defined much of the Gulf’s recent trajectory has been interrupted.
For decades, Gulf states cautiously constructed their image and a sense of security and safety for its nationals, residents and tourists. Politically and strategically, the conflict has reinforced a more hardline approach toward Iran among Gulf states. Even those that had pursued cautious rapprochement are now reassessing their positions, placing greater emphasis on deterrence and security cooperation. At the same time, the war has intensified the Gulf’s reliance on external partners for defense, while also raising questions about the reliability and limits of those partnerships.
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Compensate
As a result, the region is entering a period of recalibration, where security concerns will likely dominate decision-making for the foreseeable future. It must be noted however that the majority, over 90 percent, of the Iranian projectiles launched towards the UAE were successfully intercepted.
Countries such as the UAE have made it clear that they expect compensation from Iran once the war is over. US media reports had suggested that Saudi Arabia was pressing US President Donald Trump to continue with the war on Iran until regime change.
The evil you know
But there is also the argument that Gulf states may prefer the regime staying in its place because any democratic experiment could pose a threat to their own stability. They might also feel safer dealing with a regime that they have already become accustomed to rather than with something or someone new. It is unclear who exactly is running Iran at the moment with the whereabouts of the current supreme leader unknown. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are believed to be largely in control and that would not be less tolerated by Gulf states.
The countries repeatedly made their position clear regarding the IRGC and its proxies, particularly those in Iraq. Kuwait has blamed Iran-backed militia groups in Iran for attacks launched on the country. Oman has been the only Gulf state to remain absent from the statements of condemnation.
One possible trajectory is the emergence of a cold peace defined by managed rivalry. In this scenario, both Iran and the Gulf states come to recognize that continued direct confrontation is too costly to sustain. The war will have demonstrated the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, the fragility of global energy markets, and the risks of escalation drawing in external powers. As a result, even without genuine reconciliation, both sides may settle into a tense but stable equilibrium.
Cold peace
Under such a cold peace, diplomatic channels would likely be reopened, albeit cautiously and with limited expectations. Backchannel negotiations, possibly mediated by neutral actors, or Oman, could focus on practical issues such as maritime security, deconfliction mechanisms, and the protection of energy infrastructure. Trade might partially resume, particularly in non-sensitive sectors, as economic pragmatism reasserts itself. However, trust would remain extremely low. Military posturing would continue, and each side would invest heavily in deterrence capabilities. This would not be a return to normal relations, but rather a controlled rivalry designed to prevent another catastrophic war.
A second, more confrontational scenario involves the consolidation of a containment strategy against Iran. The war may push Gulf states—particularly those that experienced direct attacks—to deepen security cooperation among themselves and with external powers. This could take the form of more integrated air and missile defense systems, expanded intelligence sharing, and even the formalization of a regional security bloc explicitly aimed at deterring Iran.
Gulf-Iran relations in the aftermath of the war with Israel and attack on Qatar
Middle Eastern standoff
In such a scenario, relations between Iran and the Gulf would harden into a long-term adversarial standoff. Diplomatic engagement would be minimal, and economic ties would remain severely restricted. Iran, in turn, would likely respond by doubling down on asymmetric strategies, including cyber capabilities and relationships with non-state actors across the region. The Gulf would become more polarized, with clear lines drawn between Iran and a coalition of states aligned against it.
This path carries significant risks. A containment framework may provide short-term security assurances, but it also increases the likelihood of recurring crises. Without meaningful channels for dialogue, misunderstandings and miscalculations could quickly escalate into renewed conflict. Moreover, the presence of external powers could turn the Gulf into a theater of broader geopolitical competition, further complicating efforts to stabilize relations.
A third scenario envisions a return to fragmented, indirect conflict—what might be described as a new era of proxy competition. Even if large-scale war subsides, the underlying rivalry between Iran and the Gulf states could shift back into less direct forms. Instead of open confrontation, both sides might engage in influence struggles across the wider Middle East, supporting different political factions, militias, and governments.
Under the shadow of conflict
In this environment, countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and others could once again become arenas for competition. The difference, however, is that the recent war would cast a long shadow over these interactions. The threshold for escalation would be lower, and the consequences potentially more severe. Gulf states, having experienced direct attacks, may respond more aggressively to perceived Iranian influence, while Iran may see proxy engagement as a safer way to maintain its regional position without risking another full-scale war.
This scenario would perpetuate instability across the region. While it might avoid the immediate devastation of direct conflict, it would undermine long-term development and governance in affected countries. It would also make any broader reconciliation between Iran and the Gulf more difficult, as each side continues to view the other through the lens of ongoing competition.
Strategic realignment
Finally, there is a more optimistic, though less likely, scenario involving strategic realignment and conditional rapprochement. In this case, the sheer cost of the war could act as a catalyst for a fundamental reassessment on both sides. Iran, facing economic pressure and internal challenges, might seek to reduce external tensions in order to focus on domestic recovery. Gulf states, meanwhile, might conclude that long-term stability cannot be achieved through confrontation alone.
Such a shift would not happen quickly or easily. It would require sustained diplomatic effort, confidence-building measures, and possibly changes in leadership or policy priorities. Initial steps might include agreements on maritime security, limits on certain types of military activity, and frameworks for economic cooperation in specific areas. Over time, these measures could gradually build a foundation for more substantive engagement.
A key factor in this scenario would be the role of external mediators. Countries with relationships on both sides could facilitate dialogue and help bridge gaps in trust. Economic incentives, such as investment and trade opportunities, might also play a role in encouraging cooperation. While deep ideological differences would remain, a pragmatic recognition of shared interests—particularly in maintaining regional stability and ensuring the flow of energy—could drive a slow but meaningful thaw in relations.
Legacy of war
Despite its appeal, this scenario faces significant obstacles. The legacy of the war, including loss of life and damage to critical infrastructure, will not be easily forgotten. Domestic political pressures in both Iran and Gulf states may limit the willingness of leaders to pursue reconciliation. Moreover, regional and global dynamics could either support or undermine such efforts, depending on how they evolve in the coming years.
In reality, the future of Iran–Gulf relations may not fit neatly into any single scenario. Elements of each could emerge at different times or in different areas. For example, a cold peace at the state level could coexist with proxy competition in certain regions, while limited diplomatic engagement continues in parallel. The trajectory will depend on a complex interplay of factors, including the outcome of the war, internal developments within Iran and Gulf states, and the policies of external powers.
No going back
What is clear, however, is that the pre-war status quo is unlikely to return. The war has fundamentally reshaped perceptions, priorities, and possibilities. Gulf states are likely to remain more security-focused and less willing to take risks in their approach with Iran. Tehran, for its part, will need to navigate the consequences of the conflict while seeking to preserve its regional influence.
The coming years will therefore be a period of adjustment and uncertainty. Whether this leads to a more stable and cooperative regional order or to renewed cycles of tension and conflict will depend on the choices made by leaders on all sides. The stakes are high, not only for the countries directly involved but for the broader international system, given the Gulf’s central role in global energy markets and geopolitical dynamics.
In the end, the future of Iran–Gulf relations will be shaped as much by lessons learned from the war as by the enduring realities that preceded it. Geography, economics, and shared vulnerabilities ensure that Iran and the Gulf states cannot simply ignore one another. The question is not whether they will interact, but how.
Away from Hormuz
The war will accelerate long-standing efforts by Gulf countries to reduce their dependence on the strait altogether. States like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already invested in pipeline routes that bypass Hormuz, allowing oil exports to reach global markets without passing through the chokepoint. In the future, these projects are likely to expand, alongside new investments in storage facilities, alternative ports, and even overland energy corridors. The goal is not to replace the strait—which would be nearly impossible—but to ensure that its disruption no longer paralyzes national economies.
For Iran, the strait will remain a key strategic lever. The ability to threaten or disrupt shipping, even temporarily, provides Tehran with disproportionate influence relative to its conventional military power. However, the war may also have highlighted the limits of this strategy.
Sara Abrahamian is a GSPI fellow focusing on Gulf states and the wider Middle East and North Africa
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
