The Middle East was pushed to one of its most dangerous turning points and the highest level of escalation between Iran and Israel – two arch enemies whose hostility had shaped the face of the region.
War erupted between the two foes on Friday, June 13 and the region was once again pushed to the brink, already on the cusp after escalating tensions in the aftermath of Israel’s war on Gaza and Lebanon. The 12-day war left a mark not only on the two countries but also on the geopolitical balance of the wider Middle East.
Unprecedented images of attacks destroying buildings were seen in Israel as well as Iran – which had not seen this level of attacks on its soil since the 1980s war with Iraq. Iran and Israel had until June attacked each other through proxies in other regional countries, with their lands remaining immune to war.
Among the most consequential developments has been the recalibration of ties between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The war tested the relations between Tehran and the Gulf and introduced a new phase in ties, one of cautious diplomacy and strategic neutrality.
Before the war began, Iran’s ties with Gulf countries, particularly with Saudi Arabia, had been reset.
A China-brokered agreement in March 2023 restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran after a seven-year rupture. Embassies were reopened, ministers exchanged visits, and commitments were made to mutual respect and non-interference. Other Gulf states—such as the UAE, Oman, and Qatar—had already re-established or maintained channels with Tehran. Even Bahrain, which had long aligned with Riyadh in its hostility toward Tehran, began quietly restoring diplomatic presence by 2024. The groundwork had been laid for engagement—but the region remained deeply fragile.
When Israel struck Iran and Tehran responded with a wave of drones and missiles, the Gulf countries found themselves in the middle of a war that threatened to reach their soil. Caught between their strong US ties and growing diplomatic outreach to Iran, they chose to remain neutral. Though the UAE and Bahrain have diplomatic relations in place with Israel, they condemned Israeli attacks on Iran.
None of the six GCC members endorsed or participated in military action against Iran. Instead, they leaned on diplomatic tools. Qatar played a key role, due to its already open channels of indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel as well as between Iran and the US.
But the most critical turning point of the war was when the US joined in the war and carried out strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Tehran had to respond, and the most obvious target was a US base in the region, pushing the GCC on edge. Bahrain immediately took measures, urging restraint and caution in the Kingdom and closing certain roads to the public.
The target was the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar – the US’s largest in the Middle East. While the attack did not result in widespread casualties, it marked the first direct Iranian strike on a Gulf country in over a decade. Qatar swiftly condemned the strike and summoned Iran’s ambassador, but stopped short of severing diplomatic ties or calling for retaliatory action.
Qatar is arguably the Gulf country with the closest ties to Iran and was reportedly informed prior to the attack, likely carried out in coordination. The US had already emptied the base as well as other regional assets. Iran’s strike was symbolic as it had to respond to American attacks on its nuclear facilities – the regime’s greatest source of pride – in order to save face both at home but also on the global scene.
Qatar’s response was emblematic of the broader Gulf posture: outrage and alarm, certainly—but tempered by a recognition that further escalation would not serve the region’s interests.
Saudi Arabia, long the leader of Gulf opposition to Iranian influence, responded with remarkable restraint. While condemning the Iranian strike and warning of threats to regional stability, Riyadh avoided inflammatory rhetoric.
The attack also served to recalibrate Qatar’s role within the GCC. Though ties were restored, Doha was blockaded in 2017. Iran’s attack saw its fellow states rush to its defence, with UAE President Sheikh Mohammed visiting shortly afterwards. It also positioned Qatar as the country willing to take the fall and accepting an Iranian attack instead of the other Gulf states.
The Al Udeid attack galvanised GCC foreign ministers to convene urgently, reaffirming unity and exploring more ambitious collective defence planning. Gulf states are now investing in shared early‑warning systems and integrating assets like the new THAAD battery in Saudi Arabia—a move long discussed but only recently made urgent.
Immediately after the attack, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi embarked on a flurry of diplomatic calls and visits to the Gulf states, in an evident attempt to preserve relations.
Just weeks after the ceasefire, Araghchi travelled to Jeddah and met with Saudi officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It was the highest-level meeting between the two sides since the war and underscored their mutual interest in keeping open the channels of diplomacy.
For the Gulf states, the war came at a precarious moment. With economic diversification and mega-development projects underway – from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to the UAE’s push for a post-oil economy – the last thing any of them wanted was a regional war that spooked investors and disrupted energy markets.
The war briefly sent oil prices soaring above $120 per barrel, but more worrisome was the impact on commercial shipping, already strained by attacks by Iran-backed Houthis in the Red Sea.
Increasingly, leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and elsewhere view Israel’s approach to regional security – military dominance, pre-emptive strikes, and rejection of Palestinian sovereignty – as incompatible with Gulf interests. The war laid bare the extent to which Israeli actions can drag the region into dangerous escalation, often without coordination or consideration for Gulf concerns. Even as Saudi Arabia had been edging closer to a normalization deal with Israel before the war, the violence made such an agreement politically and diplomatically untenable for now.
While the US was ushering in support for Israel, deploying naval assets to the Eastern Mediterranean and carrying out strikes on Iran, the Gulf states quietly pushed for diplomatic alternatives behind the scenes.
Obstacles remain
Despite diplomatic progress between Gulf states and Iran, even in spite of the attack on Al Udeid, major points of tension still remain. Among them is the nuclear issue.
Iran continues to enrich uranium at near weapons-grade levels and there is even less international knowledge now that the UN nuclear watchdog has had its access cut off. While Iran insists its programme is for peaceful and civilian purposes, the Gulf remains skeptical.
There is also the concern of an arms race as Saudi Arabia embarks on its own domestic uranium enrichment ambitions.
Five rounds of indirect talks, mediated by Oman, between the US and Iran have been held since April aimed at returning to a nuclear deal. But the sixth round was postponed due to Israel’s war and negotiations are yet to resume. The US has called on Iran to return to the diplomacy table but Tehran argues that it was already at the table but still got attacked.
Before and during the talks, the idea of a Gulf enrichment consortium was floated which would see Iran’s uranium enrichment conducted in one of the states to allow for more transparency. Tehran has rejected the possibility.
Another unresolved issue is Iran’s regional network of proxies, particularly the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. While the Gulf states have gradually disengaged from direct military involvement in Yemen, the Houthi missile capabilities remain a constant concern. During the Iran-Israel war, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and Israel-linked vessels increased dramatically. While Gulf states stopped short of launching counterstrikes, frustration is mounting.
Rising Houthi attacks and Iran‑aligned proxies underscore the need for defence cooperation—not only to deter Iran but also transnational threats impacting Gulf trade routes and infrastructure.
On June 22, 2025, Iran’s parliament voted in favour of closing the Strait of Hormuz in response to U.S. strikes on its nuclear facilities. That decision now awaits approval from the Supreme National Security Council, chaired by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Rather than an imminent blockade, analysts view this move as a strategic deterrent and bargaining chip—designed to raise the stakes while preserving maximum leverage in negotiations.
At the same time, domestic politics constrain how far Gulf governments can go in deepening ties with Iran. This is especially true for Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman remains committed to economic reform and international prestige.
Qatar continues to host Iranian diplomats and cultural exchanges. Saudi Arabia, though cautious, is now engaged in direct dialogue with Tehran on issues ranging from security to religious pilgrimages. Bahrain and Kuwait, once hesitant, are participating in GCC-wide discussions about a framework for future cooperation with Iran. Oman, as ever, serves as a discreet facilitator and trusted interlocutor.
Gulf officials have made it clear that while distrust of Iran remains, they prefer stability through diplomacy over further confrontation in an already belligerent and unstable region. Pragmatism has overtaken mistrust and Gulf states view Iran as a stakeholder in regional stability rather than an adversary.
Sara Massoudi is GSPI fellow and journalist covering Gulf states, Turkey and the Middle East
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
