On July 11th, a faction consisting of 30 PKK members heeded Ocalan’s call and performed a symbolic act by burning their weapons, in the presence of representatives as well as political and cultural figures.
Since the duration of Ataturk’s reign, Türkiye’s official ideology has been founded
on refuting the Kurds’ self-sustaining identity and rigorously enforcing restrictions on the Kurdish community. Additionally, Kurds were barred from expressing their distinct language, culture, and political involvement. An instance would be the inhibition of Kurds’ annual Nowruz festivities; However, President Erdogan now proclaims it as a Turkish event. However, such a trajectory is now arduous to maintain.
The commencement of the peace process can be traced back to late 2024, a time when the region was embroiled in pivotal events such as the weakening of the resistance axis and the loss of power for Iran’s allies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the pivotal fall of Bashar al-Assad. (1)
This shift of power dynamics heavily favored Israel, triggering concerns from other regional powers like Türkiye about Israel’s increasing hegemony. (2) However, what truly aroused Ankara’s worry was Israel’s formidable presence in Syria and its close ties with the Kurds. (3)
The possibility of an alliance between Israel and the Kurds was a significant motivator for Erdogan to address the Kurdish issue and take preemptive action against it. In fact, this external variable played a crucial role in initiating the peace process.
Pondering the complex landscape of politics, one must also take into consideration crucial
domestic factors. It can be argued that Erdogan, in an act of self-preservation, detained his most formidable competitor in the 2028 elections, Ekrem İmamoğlu, out of fear of defeat. This fear stems from the fact that since taking office in the early 2000s, Erdogan has never been closer to defeat, as in the 2023 elections. Additionally, the ruling party has experienced a decrease in votes in the parliamentary elections. Despite still holding a majority, this trend cannot be stopped without making concessions to the Kurds in exchange for a coalition in parliament against the opposing Republican People’s Party (CHP). (4)
On the other hand, Erdogan’s political ideology, shared by many members of the Justice and Development Party, Neo-ottomanism, opens up greater opportunities for close relations with the Kurds, in contrast to right-wing and ultra-nationalist parties. However, with the potential victory of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in the upcoming elections, this opportunity may be lost.
These two factors – Israeli hegemony and concern over the Kurds forming an alliance in Syria – as well as the need for a political partnership with the Kurds in parliament, were the primary two motivators behind Erdogan’s decision to shift his stance and pursue reconciliation with the Kurdish population.
Currently, the dominant dynamics in the Middle East reflect a shift from traditional power and identity-based politics to a greater emphasis on economic and developmental concerns in foreign policy.
As evidenced by recent surveys, the majority of Turkish citizens are in favor of the general
amnesty granted to prisoners, including those with ties to the PKK. (5) Furthermore, the Kurdish population within Türkiye is largely in support of the ongoing peace process. (6)
Kurds’ primary objective in the ongoing peace process could be viewed as their increased
involvement in local governance, at least in order to establish a formidable presence in
municipalities and governorates. Their ultimate goal, however, is to amend the constitution in a manner that secures a form of self-governance at the local level, rather than a federal system.
In general, Ocalan’s analysis of the present circumstances is that the Turkish government possesses the capacity to meet Kurdish demands. Additionally, numerous Kurdish leaders agree with the current state of affairs regarding the peace process. With the Kurds having taken the initial step towards reconciliation, the responsibility now rests on the shoulders of the Turkish government and President Erdogan. Hence, one of the key requirements for the success of the ongoing process is to lay the groundwork for practical measures promoting the inclusive and democratic political participation of the Kurds, while concurrently undertaking amendments to the constitution. (7)
It could be argued that the liberation of Öcalan from imprisonment will serve as a key factor in expediting the ongoing peace negotiations.
The Turkish Kurds’ ultimate goal is to amend the constitution in a manner that secures a form of self-governance at the local level, rather than a federal system.
Another critical element will be the extent of international pressure and intervention, particularly from the European Union and the United States. For decades, the European Union has viewed democratic reforms as a prerequisite for Türkiye’s potential accession to the union. (8)
Also, the official stance of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is to welcome the disarmament of the PKK and its position is fueled by the region’s desire to alleviate the pressure and military threat posed by Türkiye on northern Iraq and beyond. (9)
It must also be noted that tensions have historically existed between the PKK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq’s domestic politics. However, with the advent of the current peace-building process, it is expected that these tensions will diminish.
A prime example of this, is the Makhmour camp in Iraq, which is set to be evacuated this autumn, as per the agreement between Türkiye, Iraq, and Kurdistan Regional
Government. Türkiye views this camp as a base for PKK forces, making its evacuation a vital step in the general disarmament process, or at the very least, a significant facilitator. (10).
Kurds’ relationship with the government in Iraq is characterized by occasional disagreements with the central government in Baghdad. These disagreements range from electricity prices (11) to oil export quotas and employee salaries (12).
Furthermore, the underlying conflict between federalism and centralism remains, with Baghdad striving to return to a centralized system. Despite some improvements in recent years and the current leadership of Al-Sudani, the situation is far from perfect for a central government.
The most significant disagreement lies with the Kurdistan Region; however, for the time being, the Kurds are relatively content with the country’s political
situation (13) and ultimately, the general trend reflects a sense of optimism.
1 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-iran-escalation-prompts-turkey-launch-talks-pkk
2 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/13/turkiye-slams-israel-kurdish-led-sdf-for-destabilising-syria
3 https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/07/24/kurds-and-turks-are-closer-than-ever-to-peace
4 https://futureuae.com/enUS/Mainpage/Item/10333/double-bet-erdogans-strategy-to-reshape-turkeys-political-
landscape-through-the-kurds-and
5 https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/08/07/majority-in-turkey-back-general-amnesty-amid-ongoing-peace-
process-prison-overcrowding-poll/
6 https://globalvoices.org/2025/08/08/have-the-kurds-turned-away-from-the-quest-for-an-autonomous-state/
7 https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/new-peace-initiative-and-kurdish-
perspective#:~:text=The%20PKK%20and%20other%20Kurdish%20political%20actors,and%20build%20a%20founda
tion%20for%20lasting%20peace.
8
https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/barbara-steiner-abdullah-Ocalan-s-freedom-is-key-to-peace-80635
9 https://globalvoices.org/2025/08/08/have-the-kurds-turned-away-from-the-quest-for-an-autonomous-state/
10 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kurdish-refugee-camp-be-evacuated-under-turkey-iraq-deal
11 https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/110820251
12 https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/060820251
13 https://theinsightinternational.com/why-iraqi-government-prefers-2025-08-05
Hameed Jabery is a researcher specialized in Middle Eastern Affairs, Graduate of International Relations, University of Tehran
