Farzad Ramezani Bonesh
Afghanistan has been a hub for many terrorist groups in the past few decades. With the Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 and the continuation of the crisis in the country, the presence of extremist terrorist groups increased in this country.
While various obstacles are in the way of the recognition of the Taliban by other countries, the major and effective actors in Afghanistan have different conditions such as the fight against terrorism[1], to recognize the Taliban. The Taliban’s approach in this field is dual or multiple.
In general, the Taliban are trying to manage foreign fighters inside the country, to please foreign actors and their terrorist allies.
It seems that the terrorist groups in Afghanistan are divided into two categories: converging with the Taliban or diverging with the group, or good and bad. Therefore, the Taliban’s approach towards jihadi-terrorist groups has three main aspects: support, tolerance, and suppression.
Convergences with the Taliban mostly include Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Jamaat Ansarullah, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Lashkar-e-Islam ,etc.
In the first approach, the Taliban provided shelters, security, amenities, and weapons and ammunition for these groups, with some special security restrictions.
For example, the alliance between the two groups of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is so deep that apart from, for example, Al-Qaeda’s congratulatory message to the Taliban after taking power, some Al-Qaeda members are now advisors and hold a number of important positions in the Taliban government. However, the Taliban’s approach is not to be seen with Al-Qaeda or to reveal cooperation.
In this approach, the Taliban either lacks the capacity to confront some groups or does not want to provoke strong reactions or change previous commitments. Or it is trying that the lack of trust between foreign fighters and jihadis, not to harm the Taliban.
The Taliban generally does not consider Al-Qaeda as terrorists, but as refugees who agree not to use Afghanistan’s soil as a platform for jihad. Therefore, there is a kind of positive and symbiotic relationship rather than repression.
Despite the denials, Al-Qaeda uses Afghanistan as a hub. The United Nations reports in 2023[2] also indicate the connection between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the coexistence of terrorist groups, and the freedom of maneuver in Afghanistan.
However, the Taliban rejected[3] the UN report and have repeatedly assured that they will respect the 2020 Doha Agreement and commitments to prevent the use of Afghan soil by any international terrorist group or individuals.
The Taliban has gradually increased its policy of controlling more of a number of jihadist organizations such as TTP, the Turkistan Islamic Movement, Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, and Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajikistan Taliban).
The Taliban has to sometimes eliminate Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party near the border with China,[4] or move them to the regions, or tries to control them by issuing a decree such as banning attacks from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
From this point of view, the Taliban does not want ISIS-K and groups such as the Pakistani Taliban or Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement to join forces against the Afghan Taliban. Also, the ideological, family, and operational connections between many groups with the Taliban, previous allegiance, etc., have even caused the Taliban to issue passports and Afghan national cards to foreign fighters.
From the perspective of the Taliban, the main deviating or bad terrorist group is the Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K). Regarding ISIS-K, the Taliban follows the approach of suppression, targeting its senior leaders, dealing with infiltration in its ranks, punishing Salafists in the east and north of the country, and pursuing intelligence cooperation with foreign actors against ISIS-K.
In fact, despite some decrease in the number of terrorist attacks, ISIS-K is the biggest security threat and rival of the Taliban with 4-6 thousand members.
The goal of the Taliban is to bring ISIS-K under control to rule Afghanistan. After the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, ISIS-K launched a series of attacks against the Taliban and dealt with the Taliban more as a government actor.
However, the presence of the Taliban in power in areas such as profiting from chaos, the release of dangerous elements of ISIS-K from prisons, expanding poverty, operational alliances with other jihadi groups, the use of ISIS forces who have escaped from prison, recruiting and the newly arrived foreign fighters in Afghanistan is an opportunity for ISIS-K.
In fact, the Taliban, by guaranteeing the stability and security of Afghanistan, is suppressing most of the branches of ISIS-K in the country and tolerates the presence of ISIS-K in some places. Also, it seems that the Taliban’s approach in the fight against ISIS-K is to prove adherence to its commitments.
The Taliban is trying to use ISIS-K and terrorism as a card game and leverage for negotiations and pressure on foreign actors. In fact, ISIS-K gives legitimacy to the Taliban to gain international support and recognition.
Afghanistan and the centrality of terrorism
Regional and international factors have always played an important role in Afghanistan’s susceptibility to terrorism in the past few decades. In the current situation, various ideological, cultural, political, economic, internal, and external factors have a wide impact.
While Afghanistan continues to enjoy the position between South Asia and Central Asia; the atmosphere of actors’ competition; the influence of Afghan actors from the geopolitical competition of foreign actors, etc., actually it is a suitable space for the reproduction and continuation of terrorism.
By pursuing the reconstruction and building of the army, the Taliban is trying to have an upper hand on the battlefield. However, the Taliban’s inability to completely dominate Afghanistan has opened the ground for terrorism in Afghanistan.
The increase of domestic and foreign political groups and opponents is also an important issue for the Taliban. The presence of military opponents in different parts of the country, the formation of numerous groups in the past two years, and the possibility of increasing differences can have different effects on the type of Taliban’s relationship with terrorist groups and getting more cooperation from them.
The three main factions of the non-Pashtun Taliban, extremists, and moderates of the Taliban have different views and perceptions towards terrorism in the country. The internal divisions of the Taliban, many disagreements between extremist and moderate leaders, the existence of some factions, and people with direct operational relations with foreign terrorist groups can have a great effect on the implementation of the terrorist commitments of the moderate elements of the Taliban.
The situation of the relationship between the three factions, the inability of the Taliban to form a practical alliance, the risk of the opposition of the middle commanders, and the fall of the inner forces will also attract more of them to other radical groups.
In addition, the Taliban has built as many religious schools as they could. More than 5,000 religious schools have been given licenses and more than 15,000 religious schools [5]are active in Afghanistan. They will be the ideological arm of the Taliban and a platform for radical thinking.
The Taliban’s attitude towards religious tyranny and Pan-Pashtunism, Taliban dictatorship, and the Taliban’s inattention to the people led to a further decrease in the legitimacy of the group and further crisis and the creation of a platform for the growth of terrorism in Afghanistan.
Remaining military equipment,[6] worsening economic crisis, poverty and famine, food crisis, and its consequences can become the basis for more terrorism in the country. Opium trade and drug turnover can also lead to the strengthening of terrorist groups.
successive trips of Taliban officials to the northern provinces of Afghanistan; Helping terrorist groups to train the forces of the new Taliban army, forced transfer of population, transfer of group members to northern Afghanistan, and “Waziristanalization of northern Afghanistan” can help Afghanistan become an important center of terrorism.
There are about 10,000 foreign fighters and about 20 terrorist groups[7] in Afghanistan. Many opponents such as Ahmad Massoud also [8]emphasize that Afghanistan has once again become a haven for global and regional terrorism.
Despite the Taliban’s promises to suppress and expel other terrorist groups, various institutions and countries do not have enough trust in the Taliban’s promises.
However, the type of selection and approach of the Taliban in the field of terrorism, good or bad, helping some or suppressing others helps to create a platform and provide a safe place for terrorists. In fact, as long as the Taliban rule in Afghanistan and there is no overall change in the political structure, terrorist groups in Afghanistan can launch attacks using the country’s soil.
Farzad Ramezani Bonesh is a writer, senior researcher, and analyst focusing on the Middle East and South Asia. He has written research articles, short analyses, and journalistic pieces in both Persian and English. He has also appeared on international outlets such as Al-Jazeera, RT, and Al-Araby.
[1] https://pajhwok.com/2022/01/02/blinken-to-taliban-reform-policies-for-recognition/
[2] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/N2303891.pdf
[3]https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/taliban-rebuffs-un-report-claiming-presence-of-terror-groups-in-afghanistan/2977276
[4] . https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/taliban-remove-uyghur-militants-along-chinas-border-report-418561
[5] https://8am.media/the-backyard-of-terrorism/
[6] https://da.azadiradio.com/a/32575641.html
[7] https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-talibans-recognition-dilemma-two-years
[8] https://www.iranintl.com/202309070952
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