The proximity of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region to Iran, the intertwining of social relations, common nomads, and various border crossings have determined Iran to pay more and more attention to this region.
Iranians and Iraqi Kurds have many cultural, linguistic, historical, and ethnic commonalities.
Farzad Bonesh
Iraqi Kurdistan is a mountainous region that borders Turkey, Iran and Syria. The capital of the region is Erbil, which the Kurdistan Regional Government officially administers. The establishment of the Kurdistan region dates back to the 1970 autonomy agreement with Baghdad.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been governed autonomously since 1991. The new Iraqi constitution of 2005 recognized Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal entity of Iraq. It has three provinces: Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, and about 5 million people.
Relations between Tehran and Iraqi Kurds go back to before the victory of the Islamic Revolution. During the past 45 years, Iran and the Kurds in Iraq have experienced relations based on a strategic alliance from 1980 to 1988 then turned to cold and tense relations in 2017.
But the relations were never broken and good tourism and economic security agreements are in place.
Iran’s approach to the Kurdistan region of Iraq
In other words, Iran is the biggest historical, national, cultural, and even ethnic ally of the Kurds. Iran’s strategic policy with Iraq has been to maintain the country’s political independence and territorial integrity. Iraqi Shiites have a higher priority for Iran than the Kurds, but Tehran has always tried to strengthen its good relations with the Kurds.
Having regional power components, Iran has sensitivities towards the region. Factors such as security concerns regarding the actions of America and Israel, the risk of geographical encirclement of Iran, ensuring regional peace and stability, playing an active role in its civilization and culture, reviving the religious identity of the Muslim nations in the region, and preventing foreign powers from dominating Iran’s approach in the Kurdistan region is effective.
It seems that Iran is seeking to reduce the presence and role of America, to prevent Turkey’s influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Previously, Iran called the decision to hold a referendum on the independence of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq an action “outside the national and legal standards, especially the Iraqi Constitution.” From this point of view, still, a blow to the territorial integrity of Iraq or trying to draw new borders can lead to instability, in Tehran’s view.
According to many in Tehran, Israel has paid special attention to Iraqi Kurdistan and intends to secure its political, economic, and strategic interests in the region by approaching Iran’s borders to fight against Iran’s regional policies.
In Iran’s political and security strategy, any development in northern Iraq with Israel’s presence in Iraqi Kurdistan will increase threats towards Iran and affect the Kurds of Iran.
Previously, security and ideological concerns against Kurdish opposition groups such as PKK and Pejak have forced military intervention and the launching of missiles from Iran to the Kurdistan Region.
Also, considering the existence of Kurdish ethnicity in Iran, the activities of Tehran’s opponents and actors such as Israel in Iraqi Kurdistan can put pressure on Iran’s territorial integrity.
After Iran carried out numerous attacks on the headquarters of the Kurdish opposition parties in 2022, Iran set September 2023 as a deadline for disarming the members and closing the headquarters of the Kurdish opposition parties in Iran.
The presence of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups such as the Democratic Party, Komle, and Pejak in the Kurdistan region and their passage across the border is seen as dangerous and one of the geopolitical threats for Tehran.
Just as Iran’s support led to the revival of Iraqi Kurds in the 1980s, Iran has a lot of soft power in Iraqi Kurdistan, and in a way, there are the most links between Iranian identity and Kurdish identity. They are considered as part of a larger civilization field – Nowruz civilization.
Recently, the visit of prominent Iraqi Kurdistan officials to Iran after 3 years, and their consultation with Iranian officials promised a new chapter in relations.
Nichervan Barzani’s trip to Tehran in the spring of 2024, participation in the funeral ceremony of Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran, Ali Bagheri’s visit to the previous head of Iran’s Foreign Ministry, and finally the first visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to the Kurdistan Region are signs of a wide improvement in relations.
Nechirvan Barzani described the first visit of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Iraq and the Kurdistan Region as a “strong message of friendship” between the two sides.
Tehran pursues access to a common language and a common view in the relationship between the two countries, with simultaneous attention to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (the importance of the balance of power between the two Kurdistan Democratic Parties and the Patriotic Union).
Pezeshkian’s trip to Sulaymaniyah also showed strong support for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
Pezeshkian rejected the request of the Kurdistan Democratic Party officials to cancel his trip to Sulaymaniyah. In addition, Tehran can play an important role in Erbil-Sulaimaniyah and Erbil-Baghdad relations and the role of mediator in solving their problems.
The impact of possible tensions on the Kurdistan region of Iraq
Tehran has been discussing the obstacles that hinder the expansion of joint cooperation for months. According to Masoud Pezeshkian, relations between Iran and the Kurdistan region are good now.
Previously Bafel Jalal Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, said that they do not allow and do not want the Kurdistan Region to be a launching pad for attacking Iran.
Nechirvan Barzani also said that under no circumstances will the territory of the Kurdistan region of Iraq be used against Iran.
The regional authorities want to distance themselves from any consequences of regional tension and not be presented as challenging activism by Tehran.
In this approach, Masrour Barzani emphasized that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq does not want to enter into regional conflicts and create threats against any of the parties to the conflict in this region. Masrour Barzani said that Kurds do not want to be a source of threat to any party, and they also do not want any party to threaten the interests of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
So, the takeway is that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq would not involve itself in any of the conflicts in the Middle East region, especially that of Iran and Israel.
But the reality is that depending on regional developments, Iraqi Kurdistan can become a place of tension or cooperation with Tehran. The Kurdistan Region may be affected by the situation in the region if Iran enters an open war with Israel.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan currently has close relations with Tehran and Iraqi Shiites.
In May 2024, relations between Erbil and Iran returned to normal. The fate of Tehran’s Kurdish adversaries could be further complicated by the wider regional tension between Iran and the “Axis of Rresistance” on the one hand, and Israel and its Western backers on the other.
After Iran’s previous attack on Iraqi Kurdistan, Erbil claimed that Tehran used an untrue justification and excuse for the attack and that the existence of Israeli intelligence centers in the Kurdistan Region was a lie.
Currently, there are good security, tourism, and economic agreements between the Kurdistan Region and Iran.
In fact, in the absence of an anti-Iranian approach from Erbil, they are probably waiting for the removal of Iran’s pressure on the Kurdistan Region, the use of Iran’s influence card to reduce Baghdad’s various pressures on the region, restore security to attract foreign investors and tourists and reduce of the risk of polarization of the Kurdistan region.
Also, if the positions of the Kurdistan Democratic Party do not conflict with the interests of Tehran, it will have positive effects on the agreements between the allied factions of Iran in Baghdad and Kurdistan, and the internal disputes in the region.
If the tension between Iran and Israel escalates, Tehran will probably demand more cooperation from Erbil in the complete dismantling of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and individuals.
According to the mentioned security agreement, it seems unlikely that Israel will be able to use the Kurdistan Region against Tehran. The statesmen of the Kurdistan Region don’t seem willing to engage in a regional war against Iran.
The mentioned security agreement establishes some coordination to protect the common borders and pursue the armed opposition of Iran in Iraqi Kurdistan.
However, if the tension between Iran and Israel expands, in case the Kurdistan Region isn’t able to fully limit anti-Iranian activities, we may see attacks against targets in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
In this case, the repetition of Iran’s attacks on anti-Iranian (or even Israeli) bases may damage the ability of the region to attract investment. So far, the crisis in Lebanon and the war in Gaza do not really affect the Kurdistan Region at the moment, unless the situation in the region expands and Iran, Iraq, and Syria directly enter this conflict. To note is that the Kurdistan Region is also dependent on the import of goods from Iran.
Farzad Bonesh is an iranian analyst and journalist covering the Middle East and Asia
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
