The echoes of artillery across the Nagorno-Karabakh battlefield haven’t fully faded, yet a new geopolitical reality is taking shape in the volatile Caucasus.
Faezeh Ghasemi
Azerbaijan’s decisive victory, orchestrated by its increasingly assertive patron Turkey, has sent tremors through the region, particularly in neighboring Iran. Here, the elation of Baku is met with a mix of apprehension and simmering anger.
Tehran, for centuries a key player in the Caucasus, now finds itself grappling with a resurgent Azerbaijan emboldened by Turkish backing, a weakened ally in Armenia, and the specter of Azerbaijan’s meddling in Azeri ethnicity hangs over Iran like a dark cloud.
This complex web of anxieties isn’t simply a product of the recent conflict; it’s a story etched in the battlefields and trade routes of the region for centuries. The echoes of past clashes, like the Safavids’ struggles against Ottoman expansion, still resonate today, shaping the current anxieties surrounding the Zangezur corridor.
Tehran worries that a resurgent Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, might restrict Iranian trade access westward, mirroring historical attempts by figures like Selim I to choke Iranian commerce via one of outstanding sanctions in the history.
Let’s take a step back in time to shed light on the roots of these ethnic and identity-based differences. As the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) unfolded, Turkey had already undergone its own period of reform known as the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876).
The Ottoman empire was transitioning from a religious empire to a nation-state, necessitating a redefinition of its identity. A similar need arose in Iran following the decline of the Safavid dynasty. Shia Islam was no longer the sole pillar of Iranian ideology and cultural identity. A cultural renaissance had taken place in Iran, based on a return to pre-Islamic Iranian identity, or in other words, Pan-Iranism.
In response to Pan-Turkism in Turkey, Pan-Iranist theories also emerged in Iran. Pan-Iranism, however, was more of a theoretical framework that later evolved into Iranism, a more moderate approach that embraced a form of multiculturalism within a unified Iran. The Turkification policies in Turkey and Iranism in Iran developed and progressed almost simultaneously.
However, both defined themselves in opposition to the other.
Turkification, which meant Turkifying neighboring ethnic groups in Turkey, was perceived as a threat in Iran. West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan, Iranian provinces, were heavily targeted for Turkification, and many elites from this region were among the first to propose concepts and theories in response to Turkification, which later became known as Iranism.
Iranism emphasizes the presence of local languages and cultures, albeit within the framework of a broader Iranian culture. Iranism or Iranian culturalism defined Iran’s cultural borders beyond its geographical boundaries. Turkification, too, for decades implied the Turkification of other linguistic and ethnic groups within Turkey’s borders, but it always had an eye beyond Turkey’s borders as well.
In a similar vein, Iran, after consolidating its power, once again sought to act like an empire. The concept of Iran-Shahr, encompassing the vast expanse of Iranian culture beyond the nation’s borders, served as the ideological underpinning of this endeavor. Haunted by the trauma of territorial losses in recent decades, Iran no longer pursued direct military conquest or territorial expansion in the classical sense. Instead, it embarked on a mission to exert cultural and identity-based influence, aiming to capture hearts and minds based on Persian and Shia.
A short while later, Erdogan’s Turkey employed a similar approach, albeit in a distinct manner. Since the Erdogan era, we have witnessed the establishment of a system based on Turkism and Sunni Islam. This new approach once again pitted Iran and Turkey against each other, beyond their borders, centuries after the fall of the Safavid and Ottoman empires.
This new confrontation is a combination of several factors: geopolitics, geoeconomics, trade and corridor competition, and most importantly, the less discussed geopolitical and ideological rivalry. In countries with weak and fragile governments, Iran and Turkey have established proxy forces, but in countries with a strong central government, efforts have been limited to cultural and social influence.
The two sides’ narratives of their cultural and civilizational influence have created different confrontations. In Syria, the two sides have been on opposite sides of the conflict since 2011. While ostensibly avoiding direct confrontation, Turkey controls groups in northern Syria that are either close to the New-Ekhwani movement or are changing the country’s demographics in favor of Turks.
Unofficially, Iran worries most about Turkmen settlements in northern Syria displacing Kurds. While Kurds are no longer a threat, Iran sees this as Turkey expanding its cultural influence, challenging Iran’s own.
Putting aside the broader geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Turkey in the sensitive Mediterranean region, which has been ongoing for centuries, both sides are seeking to use the opportunity created by the weakness of the Syrian state to strengthen their proxy forces in Syria. Turkey uses Sunni forces and Turkmen close to Turkey to expand its identity and geopolitical influence, and Iran uses Shiite groups and even exceptionally sometimes Syrian Kurdish groups.
In fact both countries have also realized that proxy forces can only be effective in the long term if they have social support in different countries. Therefore, it is not enough for Tehran to have a pro-Iranian militia in Syria or any other country; it must also be close to one of the local communities in that country. For Iran, this local community in Syria includes the Syrian Alawites. A group that, although deeply different from classical Iranian Shi’ism, Tehran prefers to consider similar.
This Syrian pattern is replicated in many other regions around Turkey and Iran. In Iraq, the two countries are expanding their proxy influence. While Iran is using Arab Shia forces and Taliban-aligned Kurds to maintain its presence in Iraq, Turkey is increasing its ties with Turkmen forces, which constitute about 5% of Iraq’s population. Turkey’s TIKA Foundation, which has 61 offices in 59 countries around the world, is also active in Iraq, engaging in cultural and charitable work for Iraqi Turkmen and establishing deep linguistic and cultural ties between Turkmen and Turks.
In Central Asia, what is called “Norouzistan” or, as is more common in Tehran, “Iranian Cultural Sphere,” stands against the Pan-Turkism of the Organization of Turkic States. The two countries have intense competition in countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which have both Persian-speaking and Turkic-speaking communities.
In Afghanistan, Iran’s historical influence is waning. This loss is keenly felt by moderate politicians who see the Taliban’s rise as a blow to Persian culture, fearing restrictions on Iranian cultural expression among Hazaras and Tajiks, two Persian-speaking ethnicities in Afghanistan.
Turkey, a relative newcomer to the region, is expanding its influence with the Uzbeks, an ethnic group with close ties to Turkic culture, and through cultural projects like the charity foundation IDEF and Afghan Turk Maarif Schools.
Iran and Turkey’s historic rivalry continues. They’ve clashed directly and more often, fought proxy wars to weaken each other. Despite tensions, shared economic and security needs keep them from open conflict. As the curtain rises on the next chapter, only time will tell if Iran and Turkey will lock horns or join hands in shaping the region’s destiny.
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
